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THE PARKE, DAVIS CASE: REFUSAL TO
DEAL AND THE SHERMAN ACT
HE CAPSTONE Of our economic system is the theory of free enterprise.
In accordance with this ideal, it has long been recognized that the
entrepreneur has the right to exercise independent discretion in choosing
the customers or class of customers with whom he will deal.1 In
exercising this right, the trader or manufacturer who indicates the
prices at which his commodities should be resold may make it clear
that he will refuse to deal with those who do not adhere to the "sug-
gested" resale prices.2  The actual enforcement of this right to choose
one's customers, however, has been carefully circumscribed by the
courts, and while refusal to sell is not expressly governed by specific
statutory provision,3 the manufacturer may not by express4 or implied
contracts,5 monopolization, or combinations in restraint of trade, "un-
duly hinder or obstruct the free and natural flow of interstate com-
merce."' 6  A recent consideration of this doctrine of refusal to sell by
the Supreme Court, in United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.,7 has led
'Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 9 (1953); United
States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (.9-9).
2 United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 721 (x944); FTC v.
Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 454 (1922).
3ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMM17TEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS,
REPORT 137 (1955).
'Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
' United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 ('944); Frey & Son,
Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 2o8 (1921) ; United States v. A. Schrader's Son,
Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1920).
'FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 44I, 452 ( 922). Section I of the
Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (i89o), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958) provides in
part:
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal ... Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any
combination or conspiracy declared by sections 1-7 of this title to be illegal shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor . . . ." This provision has been construed by the
courts "as precluding only those contracts or combinations which 'unreasonably' re-
strain combination." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 ( 958);
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. I (x9x) Board of Trade
of the City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (i918).
7362 U.S. 29 (i96o).
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many to speculate that the traditional right of customer selection, first
given judicial expression in United States v. Colgate & Co., has finally
been rendered impotent.
THE Parke, Davis CAsE
In the Parke, Davis case, civil suit was brought by the United States,
seeking an injunction under Section 4 of the Sherman Act,'" charging
that Parke, Davis, a manufacturer of pharmaceutical products, had
violated sections i and 3 of the act.' Specifically, it was alleged that
Parke, Davis took the following measures to prevent price cutting by
retail outlets in Virginia and the District of Columbia where, at the
time, no "fair-trade" laws were in effect 2 Representatives of the .com-
pany called upon retailers who were advertising discount prices and
engaging in price cutting, informing them that, unless the "suggested"
minimum retail prices were observed, Parke, Davis would refuse to deal
with them; agreements were induced with wholesale distributors to cut
off supplies of all company products to offending retailers; retailers who
refused to observe the announced resale prices were cut off both on direct
purchases from Parke, Davis and on purchases from the wholesale
distributors; Parke, Davis resumed sales to such retailers, or permitted
the wholesalers to do so, only after the retailers ceased price cutting or,
in some instances, undertook to stop cut-rate advertising.
The Government contended that Parke, Davis, by inducing and
compelling the wholesalers and retailers to promote compliance with
its price maintenance policy, went beyond mere customer selection and
thereby unlawfully entered into combinations or conspiracies to enforce
a250 U.S. 300 (1919).
o The dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan contends that the effect of the Parke,
Davis decision is "to throw the Colgate doctrine into discard." 362 U.S. at 57. Con-
pare Note, Resale Price Maintenance and the Parke, Davis Case, 46 VA. L. REV. 976
(i96o) with 58 MICH. L. REV. 920 (196o).
10 26 Stat. 209 (189o), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1958).
"The pertinent provisions of Section I of the Act are quoted in note 6 supra. Sec-
tion 3 of the Act, z6 Stat. 209 (189o), as amended, 69 Stat. 282 (1955) 15 U.S.C.
§ 3 (1958), provides in part:
"Every contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce in . . . the District of Columbia . . . or in restraint of
trade or commerce . . . between the District of Columbia and any State or States or
foreign nations, is declared illegal. Every person who shall make any such contract
or engage in any such combination or conspiracy, shall be deemed guilty of a mis-
demeanor . .. .
"
2 A "Fair Trade Act" has since been reenacted in Virginia. 'VA. CODE ANN. §§
59-8.1 to -8.9 (Supp. x96o).
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the resale price of its products. At the conclusion of the Government's
evidence, the district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss, stating
that the practices complained of constituted merely unilateral action
on the part of Parke, Davis in selecting its customers and, as such, were
sanctioned by the rule of the Colgate case.' 3 As an alternative ground
for dismissing the complaint, the district court further held that no
relief was necessary since there was "no reason to believe, or even
surmise," that the defendant would resume its efforts to maintain resale
prices.14 The Government appealed directly to the Supreme Court
under Section 2 of the Expediting Act, 5 assigning as error the district
court's determination that the conduct of Parke, Davis was in fact uni-
lateral rather than conspiratorial.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that
Parke, Davis's program to promote general compliance with "sug-
gested" resale prices went beyond "the limited dispensation which
[Colgate] confers."'0 The Colgate rule does not mean, said Justice
Brennan in speaking for the majority, that the Government must prove
an actual agreement to fix prices to show a Sherman Act violation.17
In noting that pressures of various kinds by the manufacturer may take
a case outside the Colgate exemption, Justice Brennan stated:8
[I]f a manufacturer is unwilling to rely on individual self-interest to
bring about general voluntary acquiescence which has the collateral effect of
eliminating price competition and takes affirmative action to achieve uniform
adherence . . . the customer's acquiescence is not then a matter of individual
free choice prompted alone by the desirability of the product.
Dissenting, Justice Harlan claimed that the Court's holding reduced
the Colgate rule to a hollow shell, leaving the manufacturer with a
theoretical right that was not legally enforceable.'
23364 F. Supp. 827, 829 (D.D.C. x958).
, Id. at 830.
25 32 Stat. 823 (1903), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1958).
10 36 z U.S. at 46.
17 In United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85, 99 (920) the Court
inferred the unlawful agreement from a course of dealing. See also United States v.
Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 723 (1944) i Interstate Circuit v. United
States, 3o6 U.S. 208 (939) i Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 2og,
210 (3923).
s 362 U.S. at 46-47.
'9 Justice Harlan stated: "It is surely the emptiest of formalisms to profess respect for
Colgate and eviscerate it in application." Id. at 57 (dissenting opinion).
[Vol. x961: 120
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THE COLGATE RULE IN APPLICATION
The effect of the Parke, Davis decision upon the right of a manu-
facturer freely to exercise discretion as to the parties with whom he will
deal is best understood by a brief discussion of the development of this
concept from its initial pronouncement in the Colgate case.' ° In that
case, the indictment charged that the defendant violated the Sherman
Act by unlawfully engaging in a combination with wholesale and retail
dealers to obtain compliance with resale prices previously announced
by the defendant company. Colgate attempted to accomplish this by:21
... distribution among dealers of letters, telegrams, circulars and lists showing
uniform prices to be charged; urging them to adhere to such prices and
notices, stating that no sales would be made to those who did not; requests,
often complied with, for information concerning dealers who had departed
from specified prices; investigation and discovery of those not adhering there-
to and placing their names upon 'suspended lists'; requests to offending dealers
for assurances and promises of future adherence to prices, which were often
given; uniform refusals to sell to any who failed to give the same; sales to
those who did; similar assurances and promises required of, and given by,
other dealers followed by sales to them; unrestricted sales to dealers with
established accounts who had observed specified prices, etc.
The trial court quashed the indictment on the ground that it failed to
allege any contract or agreement whereby the parties concerned were
bound to maintain fixed prices. In affirming the lower court's holding,
the Supreme Court stated:
In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the act
does not restrict the long recognized right of [a] trader or manufacturer en-
gaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent
discretion as to parties with whom he will deal. And, of course, he may
announce in advance the circumstances under which he wil refuse to sell.
The manufacturer's right to select his customers as a means of accom-
plishing resale price maintenance was further explicated by the Court
in United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc.,- decided nine months after
Colgate. In that case a manufacturer was charged with selling goods
20 250 U.S. 300 (i9 g). Prior to the Colgate decision, the Supreme Court held, in
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (.9xx), that formal
resale price maintenance agreements were in violation of Section I of the Sherman
Act.
21250 U.S. at 303.
2 Id. at 307.
23 252 U.S. 85 (1920).
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under agreements that bound the purchaser to comply with the resale
price policies set by the seller. In holding the practice to be in violation
of the Sherman Act, the Court pointed out that its decision in Colgate
merely involved the lower court's interpretation of an indictment that
"failed to charge that Colgate & Company made agreements, either
express or implied, which undertook to obligate vendees to observe
specified resale prices; and it was treated 'as alleging only recognition
of the manufacturer's undoubted right to specify resale prices and refuse
to deal with anyone who failed to maintain the same.' 1124 Thus, the
Court spelled out in unmistakable terms that the Colgate decision was
not intended to provide a blanket sanction, under the aegis of "refusal
to sell," of the individual's discretionary right to select his customers.
Moreover, an unlawful agreement or conspiracy attempting to compel
customers or a class of customers to adhere to fixed resale prices may
be inferred "from a course of dealing or other circumstances." 5 The
rationale of Schrader was reaffirmed shortly thereafter in Frey & Son,
Inc. v. Cudaiy Packing Co.,26 where the Supreme Court again had
before it a resale price maintenance scheme between jobbers and manu-
facturers.
Nevertheless, the lower courts continued to misconstrue the Colgate
doctrine to such an extent that the Supreme Court once again en-
deavored to clarify it in the case of FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co.,27
where the Colgate rule was applied in proceedings under section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act,28 which forbids unfair methods
of competition. In that case the vendor maintained a continuing policy,
similar to that of Parke, Davis, of refusing to sell to wholesalers or
retailers who did not comply with its resale prices, thereby suppressing
2 Id. at 99.
2
r See note 17 supra.
25 256 U.S. 208 (1921).
27 57 U.S. 441 (1922).
2838 Stat. 717 (igz+)
, 
as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2958). Since the
essential purpose of this act is to safeguard the economy from unfair practices that
would tend to lessen competition or create monopolies, it is possible that efforts by a
seller to maintain resale prices may be attacked under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act as well as sections x and 3 of the Sherman Act.
Moreover, where a delivered pricing system is involved such conduct may fall within
the prohibitions of § 2(a) of the Clayton Act as being an unfair method of competition.
In this regard, the Supreme Court has stated in FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S.
683, 693 (2948) that: "The [Federal Trade] Commission has jurisdiction to declare
that conduct tending to restrain trade is an unfair method of competition even though
the selfsame conduct may also violate the Sherman Act." See also Corn Prods. Ref. Co.
v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (2945).
[VOL. 1961: 120
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competition by procuring the cooperation of distributors in keeping its
product from price cutters. The Court rejected the defendant's con-
tention that such activities were sanctioned by the Colgate doctrine,
holding that the practices in question went "far beyond a simple refusal
to sell to customers who would not resell at stated prices,"29 and thus
constituted an unfair method of competition in violation of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.
In assessing the effect of Beech-Nut on the Colgate rule, the posture
in which the latter case went up to the Supreme Court is of paramount
importance. As noted earlier, the Court in Colgate held that the inter-
pretation of the indictment by the district court, to the effect that the
complaint failed to allege an unlawful agreement, was binding on the
Supreme Court and the indictment was treated as alleging only that
Colgate had refused to sell to anyone who failed to maintain the
specified retail prices. In short, there is a factual distinction between
the two cases in that Colgate's refusal to sell, as narrowly presented
in the pleadings, was an individual action, whereas the evidence tended
to indicate that Beech-Nut's conduct went beyond individually conceived
refusals to deal. Beech-Nut's establishment of an elaborate and compre-
hensive system devoted to the enforcement of its resale price policies
and the policing of retail prices, in effect, amounted to a combination in
restraint of trade.
Furthermore, the issues posed in the two cases differed. Section 3
of the Sherman Act,30 under which the Colgate case arose, requires that
some agreement be shown before a violation of the act can be charged,
for the essential purpose of the act is to provide sanctions against actual
restraints of trade. However, the Beech-Nut case was before the Court
under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.3 While the
public policy reflected in the Sherman Act is to be considered in deter-
mining what constitutes a violation of the Federal Trade Commission
2' United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.s. 707, 721 (z944)- In
Adams-Mitchell Co. v. Cambridge Distrib. Co., 189 F.zd 913 (2d Cir. 1950), Judge
Frank took the position that, on the basis of Beech-Nut and subsequent decisions, Colgate
was overruled. He stated: "Considering the course of Supreme Court anti-trust de-
cisions on the subject of price-fixing since Colgate was decided, it seems to me that,
although that doctrine may not be wholly dead, yet, by distinctions stopping short of
extinction, it has been reduced to almost imperceptible proportions." Id. at 924 (dis-
senting opinion).
so 26 Stat. 209 (iSgo), as amended, is U.S.C. § 3 (1958).
3138 Stat. Si. (x14), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (958).
Vol. i96i: 120]
DUKE LA W JOURNAL
Act, nevertheless, the latter is designed primarily to quash incipient
restraints of trade; all that is required for conduct to come within
the ambit of its proscriptions is that there be a "dangerous tendency" of
the merchandising plan unduly to hinder competition.
The dimensions of the Colgate rule were further clarified by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co."8 2 which
involved an action brought by the Government to restrain alleged
violations of Sections i and 3 of the Sherman Act. In holding that the
activities engaged in by the distributor, Soft-lite Lens Company,
amounted to a combination and conspiracy with wholesalers to maintain
resale prices in violation of the Sherman Act, the Court stated that
"whether this conspiracy and combination was achieved by agreement
or by acquiescence of the wholesalers coupled with assistance in effectu-
ating its purpose is immaterial."" Thus, the decision would seem to
indicate that, where the vendor and the distributor cooperate in a joint
policing effort to obtain adherence to a fixed resale price, the courts
will look to the business setting as a whole to determine whether such
individual refusals to sell inferentially spell out an agreement violative
of the Sherman Act. 4
In all cases in which the Supreme Court has considered the ques-
tion of a price fixing conspiracy involving a refusal to sell, it has pointed-
ly reaffirmed the vendor's right freely to exercise discretion as to the
parties with whom he will deal. 5 Nevertheless, the manufacturer who
undertakes by affirmative action to achieve uniform adherence to his
pricing policies through a systematic program of refusing to sell to un-
cooperative dealers runs the risk that such conduct might give rise to
an inference that the customer's acquiescence was not simply a matter
of "individual free choice prompted alone by the desirability of the
product,""6 but rather was the result of concerted action on the part
of the manufacturer in derogation of the antitrust laws.
32 3 2 1 U.s. 707 (-944).
" 1d. at 723.
"'See note 17 supra.
"Kor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.s. 207, 217 (1959); Times-
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 354 U.S. 594 (x953) 5 United States v.
Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 721 (1944); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v.
United States, 309 U.S. 436, 457 ( 940).
36 United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 47 (1960).
[Vol. x96x: 120
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PARKE, DAVIS REEXAMINED
A. Retail Maintenance Program
It is submitted that the dissenter's contention that the Parke, Davis
decision has emasculated and nullified the Colgate rule is unwarranted,
for it would appear from the facts adduced in the lower court that
Parke, Davis's activities to maintain retail resale prices went far beyond
any rights it had under the doctrine. The advance announcement of
"suggested" resale prices, via the retail catalogue, is not in itself sufficient
to support an inference of impropriety,3 7 for a mere warning that there
will be a refusal to sell if a pre-established price is not complied with is
neither against public policy at common law nor prohibited by the
Sherman Act. However, the company did not stop there, for repre-
sentatives of Parke, Davis made it unmistakably clear to the retailers
that their competitors were being similarly approached, impressing upon
them that such negotiations were part of a concerted program to put an
end to both price cutting and discount advertising. When one retailer
complained that a competitor was cutting prices on Parke, Davis
products, he was told that the offending retailer would be visited in an
attempt to "get him in line." Thus, while each retailer was indi-
vidually visited and informed of the resale policies, Parke, Davis
attempted to carry out its program on the basis of a common under-
standing among the retailers that all would adhere to such a policy.38
The fact that these systematic efforts to halt the price-cutting adver-
tising eventually proved unsuccessful cannot effectively be invoked as a
defense, for Section i of the Sherman Act strikes down such concerted
activities, whether successful or abortive. In any event, there apparently
was full compliance with the policy for a period of approximately three
months.
In order for a resale price maintenance program to be successful
all channels of distribution have to be controlled. Consequently, in
attempting to institute and administer the recommended pricing policy,
"'United States v. Colgate & Co., 25o U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
" The courts have consistently held price-fixing schemes of this type to be in violation
of § I of the Sherman Act. See, e.g., United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 3z
U.S. 707 (1944) ; FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922) 5 United States
v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 25z U.S. 85 (9z2o); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park &
Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911)5 cf. Connecticut Importing Co. v. Continental Dis-
tilling Corp., 129 F.zd 65! (2d Cir. 1942) 5 Shakespear Co. v. FTC, 50 F.zd 758 (6th
Cir. 1931); Moir v. FTC, 12 F.zd 22 (ist Cir. 1926); Q. R. S. Music Co. v. FTC,
12 F.2d 730 (7 th Cir. 1926); Toledo Pipe-Threading Machine Co. v. FTC, ix F.zd
337 (6th Cir. 1926).
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Parke, Davis engaged in a concerted campaign, actively enlisting-in-
deed compelling-the cooperation of its wholesalers in the accomplish-
ment of this program. The company, in addition to halting all direct
sales to price-cutting retailers, induced wholesalers to refuse to sell to
offending retailers by threatening to discontinue supplying them. It is
clear that such refusals to sell did not stem from an exercise of inde-
pendent business judgment, since the evidence indicated that they did
not resume sales to the offending retailers until authorized by Parke,
Davis. Full cooperation of the wholesalers in the area was essential
if retailers were to be effectively coerced, and only by enlisting the aid
of the wholesalers in boycotting the uncooperative retailers was Parke,
Davis able to implement its price policy. The natural and predictable
consequence of such activity is the restraint of trade or commerce. It
was precisely this sort of restrictive conduct at which the Sherman Act
was aimed. To the extent that the resale price of the commodity was
insulated from the natural interplay of economic forces in a competitive
market, such practices where inimical to the best interests of the public
and dearly contravened the basic objectives of the national antitrust
laws.39
B. Wholesale Maintenance Program
As with the retail price maintenance plan, Parke, Davis's program
to maintain its suggested wholesale prices dearly went beyond the
seller's right to refuse "to sell to customers who will not resell at prices
fixed by the seller."40  Once again, it would appear that compliance by
the wholesale distributors was prompted, not by independent discre-
" Congressional expression of our national antitrust philosophy against restraints of
trade and monopoly is embodied in three basic statutes: z6 Stat. 2o9 (189o), as amended,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1958) (Sherman Act); 38 Stat. 717 (1914) as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 41-58 (-958) (Federal Trade Commission Act) ; 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended,
15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (958) (Clayton Act). See note 28 sWprM. Our immediate con-
cern, however, is with the Sherman Act. As to the fundamental objectives of this act,
the Supreme Court stated, in Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. x, 4-5
(1958), per Black, J.:
"[The Sherman Act] rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of com-
petitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices,
the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time pro-
viding an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and
social institutions. But even were that premise open to question, the policy un-
equivocally laid down by the Act is competition. And to this end it prohibits 'Every
contract, combination ...or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States.' " [Emphasis added].
0 United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707,' 721 (x944).
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tion, but rather by a community of purpose between Parke, Davis and
its wholesalers. While such cooperation often stems from compelling
economic influences rather than from an express agreement or under-
standing, the "Damocles Sword" that apparently induced such ac-
quiescence was awareness that the consequence of non-compliance was
the cutting off of further supplies of Parke, Davis's products. As the
Supreme Court stated in Bausch & Lomb:1 "A distributor of a trade-
marked article may not lawfully limit by agreement, express or implied,
the price at which or the persons to whom its purchaser may resell,
except as the seller moves along the route which is marked by the
Miller-Tydings Act."
C. Effect on Distributees
It would appear, contrary to the finding of the district court, that
the individual visits by representatives of Parke, Davis to wholesalers
and retailers were not "to each of them separate and apart from all
others," but were an integral part of a concerted campaign by the com-
pany to put an end to the retail price cutting and cut-rate advertising.
Under these circumstances, where both retailers and wholesalers were
well aware that the cooperation of competitors was similarly being
solicited, their compliance with the Parke, Davis program supports the
inference that an illegal price fixing conspiracy had been entered into.
While the dictates of business judgment may sometimes require ad-
herence to the manufacturer's general pronouncement of its price poli-
cies, the circumstances of the instant case justifiably give rise to the pre-
sumption that such uniformity of action was not simply a case of uni-
lateral response to individual visits but was instead the result of col-
lusion and coercive influence.42
,' Ibid. The Miller-Tydings Act amended § i of the Sherman Act validating
specific types of resale price maintenance agreements in states where contracts of that
description are legitimized by state statute or policy. 50 Stat. 693 0937)
, 
as amended,
i5 U.S.C. § 1 (8ss).
2In Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226-27 (1939)
, 
the
Supreme Court affirmed the finding of the lower court that an illegal conspiracy in
violation of the Sherman Act had been entered into, stating:
"It was enough that, knowing that concerted action was contemplated and invited,
the distributors gave their adherence to the scheme and participated in it. Each dis-
tributor was advised that the others were asked to participate; each knew that co6pera-
tion was essential to successful operation of the plan. . . . Acceptance by competitors,
without previous agreement, of an invitation to participate in a plan, the necessary
consequence of which, if carried out, is restraint of interstate commerce, is sufficient to
establish an unlawful conspiracy .... " See also FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683,
716 n.17 (1948) 5 United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 274-75 (947).
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The prohibitions of the Sherman Act are limited to restraints of
trade accomplished by contract or combinations and do not extend to
practices which, while equally reprehensible, do not involve the ele-
ment of agreement. However, price fixing in violation of Section I of
the Sherman Act need not be accomplished by express contract, for
the same result may be achieved through mere understandings or im-
plied agreements 43 there need be no meetings or exchanges of firm
commitments for the practice to take root. In the instant case, the
necessary consequence of such a wholesale price maintenance plan could
only be the suppression of competition among wholesale distributors so
as not to compete price-wise with the manufacturer, "for all who would
deal in the company's products are constrained to sell at the suggested
prices."44  As in the case of direct price fixing agreements, the object
and effect of the activities complained of, when carried to fruition, is the
establishment of a noncompetive market price.
Parke, Davis AND THE Colgate RULE
The test of legality in this situation is whether the resale price
maintenance policy in question has been effectuated through unilateral
action or through an express or implied agreement of the parties.
While parallel conduct of this type is frequently the result of market
pressures, evidence of such uniform business behavior is relevant to
proof of agreement.45  The implementation of such -a pricing policy
which, as in the instant case, involves not only a systematic refusal to
sell but, in addition, seeks the active assistance of dealers in enforcing
it may well give rise to facts sufficient to support the inference that
there was something more than "mere acquiescence" on the part of the
wholesalers and retailers. The court must be sensitive to the cumulative
effect of such conduct, determining its validity in light of the atmos-
phere as a whole as well as the business context in which it is used. If
the consequences of a resale price policy are evil when accomplished
through direct price fixing agreements, they are equally harmful when
"Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 2o8 (1921).
"'FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 455 (.922).
"United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948) , American To-
bacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 78! (1946); United States v. Bausch & Lomb
Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (x944); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265
(1942); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (x939).
However, parallel business behavior alone does not conclusively establish an agree-
ment. Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537
(-9s4).
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carried out by tacit acceptance or submission to economic pressures.
Thus, the market price of Parke, Davis pharmaceutical products was
determined, not by the individual responses of buyers and sellers in an
unrestricted market, but rather through the pronouncement of a co-
ercive program of resale price maintenance. From a practical stand-
point, the Parke, Davis plan had precisely the same purpose and eco-
nomic consequence as those activities prohibited in the Miles case, i.e.,
an express contractual agreement whereby one endeavors to sell his
product and yet attempts by contract to restrict the title conveyed. Thus,
as where the parties enter into an agreement, the activities complained
of not only were designed to maintain prices after the manufacturer had
parted with title to the article, but, in addition, they were intended
to suppress competition among those who trade in such articles. Al-
though the right to select one's customers is fundamental to free enter-
prise and should be preserved, 46 the legitimizing of such activities
as were conducted by Parke, Davis would enable a manufacturer to
enforce a resale price fixing policy by indirection. Assuming that a free
competitive order is desirable, practices of the sort employed by Parke,
Davis, which dearly go beyond mere selection of particular customers,
can only serve to stifle the market price structure and deprive it of
the flexibility and resiliency essential to a healthy economy.
While many critics espouse the view that Parke, Davis has brought
about the final demise of the Colgate rule, in actuality, the right of
refusal to deal, as such, has remained relatively unqualified since its
original pronouncement in I919i. Admittedly, there is some difficulty
in determining the bounds of the Colgate doctrine. However, much
of the confusion surrounding application of this rule stems from the
unwarranted inference that the Court, in pronouncing the decision,
thereby conferred on the manufacturer an unqualified privilege of
'refusal to deal." Decisions subsequent to the Colgate case have de-
lineated the manner in which the refusal to deal may be lawfully exer-
cised. As a result, the relevant subject of inquiry has become not the
refusals themselves, since they are legally protected, but rather the
business context in which such refusals appear. Merely attaching the
label "refusal to deal" on price maintenance policies does not, in itself,
"6 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 306, 307 (igxi); Dunn, Resale
Price Maintenance, 32 YALE L.J. 676, 705 (1923).
' See Handler, Annual Review of Antitrust Developments, 15 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A.
362, 363 (196o).
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impose an exceptional or extraordinary restriction upon the general
operation of the antitrust laws.
CONCLUSION
In summary, rather than overruling the Colgate decision, Parke,
Davis serves only to delimit it further. When dealing with customers
unwilling to comply with his price maintenance program, the manu-
facturer continues to enjoy the right of refusal to sell, so long as he
relies solely on the vendee's individual self-interest to prompt voluntary
adherence to the stated price list. However, a manufacturer who at-
tempts to control resale prices in this manner is put on notice that such
activity may constitute an undue restraint of trade in violation of the
Sherman Act.
A thorough factual analysis of the resale price policies pursued by
the manufacturer is essential to any decision concerning the legality of
such a program. Although there may be economic justification for such
activities by the trader or manufacturer, nevertheless, they are proscribed
because of their actual or potential threat to the economy. Thus, the
courts must attempt to accommodate the businessman's freedom in
selecting his customers with the public's vital interest in prohibiting
unreasonable restraints on the free flow of commerce.
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